EUROPE
A
SLAVE,
UNLESS
England
Break Her
CHAINS.

Diſcovering the Grand Deſigns of the *French-Popiſh-Party* in

ENGLAND

for ſeveral years paſt.

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Unleſs

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Break her CHAINS.

WHat His moſt Chriſtian Majeſty has lately enterprized upon *Valenciennes*, *Cambray*, and St. *Omers*, the beſt Fortified places of the Spaniſh *Netherlands*, and the only remaining Bulwarks of thoſe Poor Provinces toward *France*, together with the Progreſs of his Armes upon the Frontiers of *Germany*, the Confines of *Spain*, in *Sicilie* and in *America*, gives all the

reſt of *Europe* occaſion to be ſolidly apprehenſive of its danger: which if it were, perhaps it might have been more advantagious for this great Monarch not to have done ſo much.

In truth, by the rapid Conqueſts which this Victorious Prince has obtain'd in ſo ſhort a time, of three ſuch important Places, he has apparently demonſtrated to all *Europe* the extent of his great and vaſt deſigns; and the weakneſs and low Condition of *Spain* as palpably diſcovers, that there is all the reaſon in the World to believe, that if *England* would but awake out of that Lethargie wherein it hath layen for ſo many years, and put her helping hand to the work, ſhe might be a great means to prevent the misfortunes and Calamities to which all thoſe Eſtates and Countries that border upon *France* are now expoſed.

I was the more apt to flatter my ſelf with a hope of this nature, for

for that although I am not altogether ignorant, how much the French Court has won upon the Court of *England*, yet I was of Opinion that the Engliſh, being ſo invincibly jealous for the preſervation of their liberty, finding that his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty had made ſuch an important Conqueſt, while the Parliament was ſitting, would by the Mediation of that Noble Aſſembly, have made their humble addreſſes and earneſt repreſentations to their Monarch, and not have left till they had beſought him to conſent what his own honour and the ſafety of his people required. But by fatal Experience we ſee, that as to that which all *Europe* calls a *Parliament*, if the ſame Anticipations and Connivances continue there with that fatality which we have hitherto obſerved, that to our great ſorrow, we ſhall be conſtrain'd to believe what the Emiſ-

rest of *Europe* occasion to be solidly apprehensive of its [illegible]; whereof it were, perhaps, [illegible] more [illegible] for this great Monarch not to have [illegible].

In truth, by the rapid Conquests which this Victorious Prince has obtain'd in so short a time, of three such important [illegible], he has apparently demonstrated to all *Europe* the extent of his great and vast designs; and the weakness and low Condition of *Spain* as palpably discovers, that there is all the reason in the World to believe, that if *England* would but awake out of that Lethargie wherein it hath laven for so many years, and put her helping hand to the work, she might be a great means to prevent the misfortunes and Calamities to which all those Estates and Countries that border upon *France* are now exposed.

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ſaries of *France* publickly themſelves declare, that two thirds of that Aſſembly are Caball'd and manag'd by the Golden *Lewis's* of *France*; in ſuch a manner, that from the ſame part from whence all *Europe* hope to behold the Sun of their reſtauration riſe, if there be not a ſudden change, which all good men expect for all this from the Engliſh Generoſity, there they ſee a formidable power advance it ſelf, in Combination with *France*, for the utter deſtruction of Chriſtendom.

I know there are ſome that pretend to great inſight, who being either endu'd or ſurpriz'd with the Opinions and Maxims which the French Emiſſaries every where inſinuate, are of opinion, that for the Imperialiſts there might be ſomething done ſo conſiderable in the Courſe of this Campaigne, which if it ſhould happen proſperouſly to ſucceed, it would follow

follow then that ſome ſolid remedy might be apply'd to cure the miſchiefs and apprehenſions of all the reſt of *Europe*. This is that which is diſcourſed in all the Courts and Countries of the *North*. But not to diſtaſte theſe men of Contemplation, I muſt beg leave to be of a contrary judgment, and to hold that all their hopes are ill grounded; and that for ſeveral reaſons.

We muſt confeſs, there is no improbability but that the Imperial Army might force a way into *France*, which would certainly prove a notable home thruſt: but then on the other ſide we muſt conſider, that the Army which is deſign'd for ſuch an Expedition muſt endure all the hardſhips of a Twenty Leagues March through Countries burnt and waſted, ſo that ſuch an Army would be very much incommoded for want of all ſorts of neceſſary Proviſions both

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for Horſe and man. Now in regard the Imperialiſts, being once paſs'd beyond *Mayence*, *Coblents* and *Treves*, have no Magazines, all the Countrey beyond the Line of *Treves* to the very Confines of *France*, except ſome part of *Luxemburgh*, being under the abſolute Power of the Enemy ; this being ſo, how is it for us to imagin, that the Imperialiſts ſhould do any things conſiderable, being to March either through a Country burnt and waſted, or through that part of *Luxemburgh*, which is at preſent a meer Deſart, more eſpecially conſidering that the *German* Armies are thoſe of all *Europe* that carry along with them the moſt numerous luggage and peſterment of women, and unprofitable mouths.

Secondly, though it were true that the Imperialiſts ſurmounting all theſe difficulties, ſhould break in as far as *Lorian*, the Territory of *Metz*,

Metz, or the County of *Burgundy*, which is all that is to be expected in one Campaigne, what is it that this Imperial Army can do conſiderable, in a Country of which all the ſtrong holds are in the poſſeſſion of the Enemy, and all the reſt of the Country burnt and laid waſt? Now as all theſe exploits of the Imperaliſts can tend to no other end, but either to give Battel, or to lay Siege to ſome conſiderable Town, it is eaſie to foreſee that if they aime at the firſt, and that the French are intended to decline it, as they are maſters of all the Country behind, and of each ſide, who ſhall be able to force them to fight? Or if it comes to that paſs that they are forc'd to hazard a Battel, it is moſt certain that the one or the other will be Victor. Should then the Imperialiſts get the better, let us examine what they will be in a condition to do, ſhould they ob-

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Metz, or the County of *Burgundy*, which is all that is to be expected in one Campaigne, what is it that this Imperial Army can do considerable, in a Country of which all the strong holds are in the possession of the Enemy, and all the rest of the Country burnt and laid waste? Now as all these exploits of the Imperalists can tend to no other end, but either to give Battel, or to lay Siege to some considerable Town, it is easie to foresee that if they aime at the first, and that the French are intended to decline it, as they are masters of all the Country behind, and of each side, who shall be able to force them to fight? Or if it comes to that pass that they are forc'd to hazard a Battel, it is most certain that the one or the other will be Victor. Should then the Imperialists get the better, let us examine what they will be in a condition to do, should they ob-

tain a compleat Victory. I believe it will be granted me that the chief Benefit of ſuch a victory will be only the Siege of ſome good Town, by that means to ſecure ſome poſt for the Conveniency of the Army againſt the next Campaigne. For to venture far into an Enemies Country without this precaution, I do not believe that the Imperialiſts either will or ought to do it. For ſhould they hazard ſuch an attempt, they would be conſtrain'd to leave ſeveral ſtrong Gariſons behind 'em, which being well ſtufft with French Cavalry, would never ſuffer the German Convoys to paſs quietly, and perhaps cut off the greateſt part of them. But on the other ſide, ſuppoſe the French will avoid fighting, keeping themſelves in an actual poſture of defence, or though they ſhould be conſtrain'd to give battel, and loſe the day, yet the ſcatter'd Troops of that,

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beaten Army, being ſpedily reinforc'd by the adjoyning Garriſons, would be ſtill ſtrong enough, though but in volant parties, to prevent the Imperialiſts from doing any thing conſiderable. Here you are to obſerve that what I have ſaid already is only in reference to the firſt Caſe of the March of the Imperialiſts in an Enemies Countrey, and the gaining a Victory. But as it would be an extraordinary piece of Flattery to determine, that the Imperialiſts ſhould be infallibly Victors; I believe, that before we leave this firſt point, it will not be amiſs to examin what would probably happen, in caſe the Armies ſhould joyne, and the French ſhould get the day. Nor do I think it will require a long diſcourſe, to make the reader apprehend the bad conſequences of ſuch a loſs to the Imperialiſts. It being notorious that in regard of the ſtrong places

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which the French poſſeſs in *Lorain*, *Burgundy* and *Alſatia*, after the loſs of a Battel, *Germany* would labour under two inevitable miſchiefs.

Firſt to ſee that Army beaten, and conſequently utterly ruined and cut off in the purſuit. The ſecond to ſee the French paſs the *Rhine* at *Briſgow*, and there cutting out ſuch troubleſome work for *Germany*, which yet ſhe never beheld nor had ever ſuffered in thoſe parts.

Again if by an attempt no leſs proſperous than the former, the Emperour and the Empire ſhould make a ſecond tryal, and be ſo unfortunate as to loſe a ſecond Battel, a thing not unlikely, whether this Campaign or the next, conſidering how the Correſpondencies of the French are maintain'd in the Court of *Bavaria*, and other Courts of the Empire, we muſt look upon all that part of *Germany* which borders

ders upon the *Rhine* for two or three days journey together totally loſt without hopes of recovery, and the rather for that a great part of thoſe Countries is all conſum'd and waſted, and can never be able to afford Conveniencies for winter Quarters, nor to ſupply the Imperial Armies in their Marches. And this is very near as much as I can think obſervable in caſe of the March of an Imperial Army in the Enemies Country, and in caſe of giving Battel, which is the firſt point. Now let us come to that of laying a Siege.

As to what has paſs'd at the ſieges of *Philipsburgh*, and *Maeſtricht*, with different Enemies, two things are obſervable. The firſt, that the French underſtand very well how to fortifie their ſtrong holds according to all the Rules of Art. And alſo for the ſecond, they underſtand as well how to defend their Fortifications, & diſpute it Inch by Inch with

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their Enemies, with an admirable conduct, and undaunted Courage. From which reflections it may be naturally concluded, that in caſe the Imperialiſts, being enter'd into an Enemies Country, go about to lay any formal Siege; as without queſtion it muſt be before ſome conſiderable Town, 'tis ten to one but that the ſeaſon of the Campaigne will be over before they can bring their deſign to paſs. From whence I conclude that this March of the Imperial Army, whatever way they take, can never produce any greater benefit, than the taking of ſome place in *Loraine*, the Territory of *Metz*, *Luxemburgh*, or the County of *Burgundy*, and by the gain of that place to diſorder thoſe Gariſons which the French hold in *Alſatia*, which however is not ſufficient to ſave the Provinces of the Spaniſh *Netherlands*, which is the preciſe Platform, by which his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty might with-

without difficulty mount to the Univerſal Monarchy, if thoſe Provinces were loſt; there being no Power at preſent in a probable condition to hinder him.

Now if it be true what I have already affirm'd, and what I ſhall afterwards maintain, that by the Conqueſt of the united Provinces of the Spaniſh *Netherlands*, his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty may jump into the Univerſal Monarchy, that all *Europe* may evidently know the danger of the preſent Conjuncture if there be no remedy from *England*, and other places intereſted, and that with all the ſpeed imaginable, there are theſe five things to be attentively conſidered.

The firſt is, that his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty being maſter of all the Poſts, Paſſages, and ſtrong Places of the County of *Burgundy*, it behoves us to conſider, that though this Prince ſhould do nothing more during this whole Campaigne but only

their Enemies, with an admirable conduct, and undaunted Courage. From which reflections it may be naturally concluded, that in case the Imperialists, being enter'd into an Enemies Country, go about to lay any formal Siege; as without question it must be before some considerable Town, 'tis ten to one but that the season of the Campaigne will be over before they can bring their design to pass. From whence I conclude that this March of the Imperial Army, whatever way they take, can never produce any greater benefit, than the taking of some place in *Loraine*, the Territory of *Metz*, *Luxemburgh*, or the County of *Burgundy*, and by the gain of that place to disorder those Garisons which the French hold in *Alsatia*, which however is not sufficient to save the Provinces of the Spanish *Netherlands*, which is the precise Platform, by which his most Christian Majesty might with-

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only diſpute the Ground with the Imperialiſts, it is not to be avoided, but that the Campaigne muſt break up, and the Imperial Army retire without doing any thing conſiderable for the preſervation of the Provinces of the Spaniſh *Netherlands*: For not to flatter our ſelves, would we have had the Imperialiſts have attempted any thing great for the Safety of thoſe Provinces, neceſſity requir'd that while the Imperialiſts directed their March undauntedly into the Bowels of *France*, with an Army of fifty thouſand men, the Confederate forces, then in the Spaniſh *Netherlands* ſhould have broken into *Picardy*, or the Territory of *Boloigne*, by ſuch a powerful diverſion to have favour'd the grand and Capital Enterprize of the Imperial Army. But by the fatal loſs of *Valenciennes*, *Cambray* and St. *Omers*, *France* is ſo well entrench'd on that ſide againſt all

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the Attempts of the Confederate Armes in thoſe parts, that it is abſolutely out of their power by reaſon of thoſe Conqueſts to penetrate on that ſide into the Kingdom of *France*. Now we may eaſily perceive, that *France* having nothing to fear from *Flanders*, will content it ſelf only to leave a ſmall Army in thoſe Quarters adjoyning to the Provinces of the Spaniſh *Netherlands*, which by the aſſiſtance of thoſe ſtrong Garriſons under its Dominion in the ſame Provinces, will be a force ſufficiently competent to amuſe all the power of the *Dutch* and *Spaniards* on that ſide during the ſeaſon of this Campaigne, and to prevent their doing any thing conſiderable.

In the ſecond place, This being the condition of *Flanders*, and *France* being out of all apprehenſion of danger in reference to its Conqueſts in the Provinces of the Spaniſh *Netherlands*, and the Provinces

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vinces of *Picardy*, *Boloigne* and *Artois* which are guarded and ſecur'd by the Conqueſts of *Valenciennes*, *Cambray*, and St. *Omers*, it plainly appears that *France* is at her full liberty, to make head with the main body of its forces in oppoſition to the enterprizes of the Imperial Armies.

Seeing then that *France* finds herſelf in this ſafe condition, I muſt leave it to all men of ſence and judgment, as a ſolid prognoſtication of all that can be expected from the attempts of the Imperial Armes for the preſervation of the Provinces of the Spaniſh *Netherlands*. For ſuppoſe that the Imperialiſts ſhould advance to the Frontiers of *France*, with an Army of fifty thouſand men, which is almoſt all that they can do, *France* will meet them with an equal force, or perhaps with a greater number, with this difference, that whereas the Imperialiſts, to obtain

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the advantage of getting to the Frontiers of *France*, ſhall be forc'd to undergo a thouſand difficulties and hardſhips, in croſſing a waſted and deſolate Country, the French have nothing to do but by eaſie Marches in their own Countrey to meet them, Maſters of all the Territories behind and on each ſide, furniſh'd and provided with all things neceſſary, and where they had all the advantages imaginable to attack them as they ſhould ſee occaſion.

Thirdly, that we may not ſeem to rely in vain upon the endeavours of the Confederate Forces in the ſaid Provinces, we muſt conſider, that by reaſon of the lopping off ſo many conſiderable Members from the body of thoſe Provinces in the Wars of 1667. and ſince the beginning of this preſent War, it is abſolutely impoſſible to be able to do any thing conſiderable againſt *France* without a force much greater than that of *France*. Fourth-

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Fourthly, The *Spaniards* themſelves ſince the beginning of this War, through the misfortune of the Minority of their Prince, being unable to eſtabliſh Magazines of Victuals, Ammunition and Provender for the Horſe, for the ſubſiſtance of their own and the Armies of their Allies, and being under the ſame neceſſities and diſabilities, through the ſame misfortune during this Campaigne, it is impoſſible for this only defect, that any conſiderable Armies ſhould ſubſiſt in the ſaid Provinces for ſo long a time as is requiſite, or that the March of the Army ſhould be order'd as the ſuddenneſs of emergent occaſions requires, to oppoſe the progreſs of the Enemy, or to gain any conſiderable advantage upon him. And this may ſerve for a real proof of this Truth, that we need no more but obſerve what has paſs'd within theſe three years in the beginning, progreſs and end of all the Campaignes

paignes in the ſaid Provinces, including the beginning of this.

Fifthly, although it be true that by the advancement of his moſt Serene Higneſs *Don John* of *Auſtria* to the Dignity of Captain General, and Firſt Miniſter of the Spaniſh Monarchy, we may certainly expect a great change in the Government of the Monarchy of *Spain*, however 'tis very true that if we conſider the moſt wonderful diſorders which have crept into the Miniſtry of that Monarchy during two ſucceſſive Reigns, the little time that this Heroick Prince has enjoy'd his Dignity, and the neceſſity that conſtrains him in the firſt place to provide for the affairs of *Sicily* and the Frontiers of *Spain*, make it out to be impoſſible for him to furniſh ſufficient ſuccours for the preſervation of theſe Provinces.

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Now all that has been already ſaid, being ſolidly true, which may be reduc'd to three heads, Firſt, That the Imperialiſts during this Campaign can do nothing conſiderable for the ſafety of the *United Spaniſh Netherlands*. Secondly, That there is no ſolid Reliance to be had upon the Enterprizes of thoſe Forces which have defended thoſe Provinces for theſe 3 years. And, Thirdly, That *Don John* is not in a capacity to relieve or remedy theſe misfortunes; we muſt of neceſſity conclude that his Moſt *Chriſtian Majeſty*, at the end of this Campaigne, or before the beginning of the next, while the Imperialiſts and Hollanders are in their Winter Quarters, will be in a condition to Randeſvouze a new body of an Army out of his Garriſons in the Frontier Provinces, and with this new Army to come and ſweep all before him, and make an end of his work, by taking all principal places

ces that remain unconquered in the Provinces of the *Spaniſh Netherlands*; by means whereof the reſt will eaſily ſubmit to the Conquerours Yoke; Neither the Loyalty nor the Courage of the poor Inhabitants being able to protect them from this misfortune. And then his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty will have no more to do but to puſh forward by Sea and Land his Monarchical Deſigns, to bring under his Yoke the two thirds of *Europe*.

But becauſe ſome Critick may perhaps imagine that my Concluſion in the preceding Paragraph is not ſolidly enough maintain'd to be eſtabliſh'd and made a poſitive maxime, after that manner as I have done it, I think it but neceſſary before I go any farther, that no perſon may flatter himſelf to the contrary, to ſhew palpably and plainly the poſſibilities for his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty to execute

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Victoriouſly, by the time by me ſuppoſed, what I have advanced for truth. To which purpoſe I deſire the Reader to conſider theſe four things by way of addition.

Firſt, That it is naturally impoſſible but that the Dutch Army by death, ſickneſs, or deſertion muſt be diminiſh'd above a third part.

Secondly, That in caſe his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty ſhould undertake any ſuch conqueſt at the time afore-mentioned, it is impoſſible to determine, but by conjecture, which may prove deceitful, upon which place he will firſt begin to make his attacques; ſo that, ſuppoſing that the Hollanders do lend their Forces to the Spaniards, there will be a neceſſity that thoſe Forces ſhould be divided into all thoſe places which the Spaniards poſſeſs in the United Provinces; from whence it conſequently follows, that it will be impoſſible that by means of this diviſion and allotment

ment of thoſe Forces, they ſhould be capable to defend all the Grand places which the Spaniards yet poſſeſs, which being once attacqu'd and taken, all the reſt excepting only *Luxemburgh*, will be conſtrain'd to ſurrender.

Thirdly, it being granted that the Hollanders do lend their Forces to the Spaniards, and that they are divided and ſeparated into ſeveral Garriſons as I have already declared, we may certainly conclude, that if his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty has a deſign to ſit down before the ſaid places, neither the Hollanders, nor the Spaniards having a body of an army in the Field, as being all diſtributed into Garriſons, for the ſecurity of particular places, He is at his full liberty to attacque which, and as many as he pleaſes at a time without controul, and coming to be maſter of the Forts, he is maſter of the Forces likewiſe: and ſo the queſtion will be, whether

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ther it were not better for them to quit their Towns without ſo much as a Summons, than to loſe their men. For if we do but make a ſerious Reflexion upon the violent and rapid manner of the French Attacques, it being the humour of the preſent King not to care how many thouſand Mens lives he ſacrifices to his impetuous deſires of Conqueſt, it is naturally impoſſible but that they ſhould take all the places which they attaeque, as being out of all expectance of relief. So that all the Places which remain to the Spaniards in the *Low Countries* ſhall be ſwept away, before the Imperialiſts can be in a condition to move; I only except *Luxemburgh* for this year, which upon the next Invaſion is to run the ſame fortune with *Burgundy*, and it may be the next Campaign, as being without Garriſons or Forces for its defence; there being nothing more certain than that the

Souldiers

Souldiers in the Conquer'd Garrisons will be prisoners of War to the Victor.

We may add for a fourth, not to flatter our selves that the violence of Seasons, or the maxim of keeping in Winter Quarters gives any stop to theFrench heat,that it behoves us to consider what time his Most Christian Majesty made his first Irruption into the County of *Burgundy*, and what his Armies have done since the beginning of this War, all in the Winter time, or at the end of Campaignes, when the Enemies Army was never so little retir'd, or before theycould be upon their marchat the end of Winter. Or if we had forgot all this, the second invasion of *Burgundy*, the conquests of *Montbellian*, *Cambray*, *Valenciennes* and *St. Omers* may refresh our memories. Which in my opinion may suffice to make us sensible that if *England* do notstep in before the end of this Campaigne, his most Christian Majesty will be certainly in a condition, at the time

which I have mention'd, to make a final conqueſt of all the Spaniſh Netherlands.

Now his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty being in ſuch a condition, from what you may believe that he will never neglect ſuch a favourable conjuncture, we are alſo to take notice, that the ſaid Monarch out of a ſupreme and capital Intereſt, cannot diſpenſe with the Execution of his intended enterprizes at the time by me already expreſſed. For the Imperialiſts at the end of the Campaigne, taking up their Winter Quarters in *Loraine* and *Luxemburgh*, his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty has but one Expedient of Diverſion to conſtrain the Imperial Army of courſe to quit at the begining of the next Campaigne, all the ſaid Countreys, and to retreat on the other ſide of the *Rhine*, which his moſt Chriſtian Majeſtie will eaſily compel them to do, if the Spaniſh Provinces or their Principal ſtrong Holds fall at the ſaid time into his hands. For

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this Conqueſt being made, his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty ſhall not only be in a Condition to keep up an Army of fifty thouſand men, upon the Confines of *Lorain*, the Territory of *Metz*, and the County of *Burgundy*, to oppoſe the Imperialiſts, but alſo with an Army of the ſame force to ſeize almoſt without any oppoſition upon the Counties of *Juliers* and *Cleves*, and ſo to get footing beyond the *Rhine* on that ſide *Weſtphalia*, to encourage the Princes of his Cabal in thoſe parts, and probably to force the Imperialiſts, wherever they are at that time, by reaſon of the Alarms of which they are ſo apprehenſive from the Coaſt of *Bavaria*, which only expects an opportunity for invading *Tirol*, to keep cloſe together in a body on the other ſide of the *Rhine*, on purpoſe to watch the motion of their Enemies.

Now all that has been ſaid above being brought to paſs in this manner, to the end we may believe that his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty will be in

a condition to ſubdue the third part of *Europe*, we are to take notice once for all, that this ſame Prince with only the Forces of his own Kingdom, has been able not only to defend himſelf from the confederated Forces of his Enemies, but that to this very time, all that conſiderable ſtrength has not been able to get one ſingle Farm of the ancient Patrimony of his Kingdom, while this ſame Prince actually takes without any oppoſition, from the Principal Chiefs of the Confederacy, Fortreſſes, Cities, Towns and whole Provinces; and as if it were not ſufficient to advance the Progreſs of his Victories by Land, in the Provinces of the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, upon the Frontiers of *Germany*, upon the Confines of *Catalogne*, and in *Sicily*, to the end you may not be ignorant how formidable his power is everywhere, he gives an occaſion to all *Europe* with amazement to behold, how this ſame Monarch, within theſe two years under the pretence of

of the *Sicilian* War has not obtained only the abſolute Dominion of the Mediterranean Sea, upon all the Coaſts of *Spain*, *Italy*, and his own Dominions, but that he has had the courage, and a force equal to his courage, out of the ſuper-abundance of his Naval Power, to ſend the Count *d'Eſtrees*, with a Royal Fleet to the *Indies*, which to the ſhame of the Engliſh and Hollanders, makes thoſe Conqueſts, of which the conſequences will not fail to trouble thoſe two Nations hereafter, and to be moſt cruelly tormented and incommoded in their moſt Eſſential and Capital Intereſts both of Eſtate and Commerce.

And as if it were not enough in ſo many different Countreys to make all the Progreſſes above-mentioned, we are ſeriouſly to conſider that this ſame Monarch by his vaſt Banks of ready money is able not only nobly to ſupport his Armies in all thoſe parts by Sea and Land in ſo many different and diſtant Countreys; but

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And as if it were not enough in so many different Countreys to make all the Progresses above-mentioned, we are seriously to consider that this same Monarch by his vast Banks of ready money is able not only nobly to support his Armies in all those parts by Sea and Land in so many different and distant Countreys; but

a condition to subdue the third part of *Europe*, we are to take notice once for all, that this same Prince with only the Forces of his own Kingdom, has been able not only to defend himself from the confederated Forces of his Enemies, but that to this very time, all that considerable strength has not been able to get one single Farm of the ancient Patrimony of his Kingdom, while this same Prince actually takes without any opposition, from the Principal Chiefs of the Confederacy, Fortresses, Cities, Towns and whole Provinces; and as if it were not sufficient to advance the Progress of his Victories by Land, in the Provinces of the *Spanish Netherlands*, upon the Frontiers of *Germany*, upon the Confines of *Catalogne*, and in *Sicily*, to the end you may not be ignorant how formidable his power is everywhere, he gives an occasion to all *Europe* with amazement to behold, how this same Monarch, within these two years under the pretence

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alſo in his Cabinet by the ſame means of his vaſt treaſures, and the dexterity and vigilancy of his Miniſters, to direct and uphold in a moſt wonderful manner, the power of the *Swede*, againſt all the Oppoſition that has attacqued him, and in the heart of the Empire to controule and manage thoſe Princes, who under the counterfeit and falſe Title of Neutrality, by the aſſiſtance of the ready money of *France*, keep conſiderable Armies on Foot, which upon the leaſt misfortune that ſhould befall the Empire, would be ready to take hold of the opportunity to the diſadvantage of the Empire. By the ſame intereſt of his ready money he not only governs the ſecret Counſels of *Poland*, but ſo orders his affairs that the publick *Diets* of that Kingdom applaud the ſuffrages of the ſame Court in thoſe very points, which according to the Rules of Judicious *Policie*, will certainly ruine by the Conſequences all the chief Priviledges of that Republick. By the

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ſame means he governs the Politick Dyets of the Cantons of *Switzerland*, in ſuch a manner, that though that Nation, by the Conqueſt of *Franche Comte*, do perceive a curb to be put in their mouths, which may be a means to bring them into ſlavery, nevertheleſs they ſtill furniſh him, through an inſufferable blindneſs, with the beſt of their men, on purpoſe to aſſiſt him to over-run the reſt of *Europe*, as if after all the reſt come to be ſubdu'd and vanquiſh'd, this Republic alone would be able to reſiſt the power of *France*, when her victorious Monarch ſhall advance four ſeveral wayes to attack it with all his Forces

But theſe are not the bounds that limit the Influence of the French Money; it ſpreads it ſelf yet more wonderfully. *Italy* is repleniſh'd with perſons of great wiſdom and foreſight; and without all contradiction that Nation of all *Europe* is naturally the moſt capable to dive into all the conſequences that may happen upon

the progreſs of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſties deſigns; nevertheleſs by an Enchantment till now unheard of, the Potentates and Republicks of that part of *Europe*, remain unanimouſly buried in an unconceivable Lethargy, and this at a time, when they ſee by the ſucceſſes of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty in *Sicily*, the flames of a War ready to be kindl'd in their own Countrey, and that too in ſuch a part, as has alwayes prov'd fatal to it, and that from the ſame part, as alſo from *Pignerol* & *Monaco* they find the French Armes aſſured of three infallible Ports that give them free entrance by three different wayes without any Poſſibility for any Power of Chriſtendom, if the *Empire* and *Spain* be once brought to ſubmit, to prevent their misfortune.

But if the Mercenary humour of the *Swiſſes*, and the ſoftneſs of the *Italians*, may ſeem to furniſh thoſe Nations with any excuſe, whether good or bad, to ſhake off the blame from themſelves for not having hitherto done

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having cut off the locks of his hair, ſhe may be able to make her ſelf maſter of his Honour and his Puiſſance.

Neither is it here that the politick managements of the Counſels of *France* make a ſtop: For the miniſtry of *France* has not only acquir'd almoſt an univerſal control in all the Courts of Chriſtendom, from which thoſe of *Vienna* and *Madrid* have not been exempted; but it is alſo certain, that by his penſions of ſeveral Millions, neither the deceas'd Grand *Viſier*, nor the *Cham* of the *Precopite Tartars*, even to the laſt Peace with *Poland*, did act otherwiſe than according to the directions and deſires of the Moſt Chriſtian King; of which the laſt wars and the Peace with *Poland* have furniſh'd us with a lamentable but authentic Proof, and is to us a farther Argument that he who ſucceeds in that charge, concurs in the ſame Politicks with his Predeceſſour; and that his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty is not unmindful of his Addreſſes to him. And it is

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obſervable, that no ſooner l as the Muſcovite threatned the *Swede* with a War upon *Livonia* ſide, but the Great Turk has menaced the Muſcovite with an Invaſion of his Territories with all his Forces.

If then his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty by the ſole and only Forces of his own Kingdom, at a time when he is conſtrain'd to keep in pay above a h ndred thouſand men, without any Hyperbole, as well in Garriſon as in the Field, in the parts adjoyning to the Spaniſh Provinces, and his neighbouring Conqueſts, yet for all this makes ſuch irreſiſtable Progreſſes as well by his Armes as with his money, I leave it to all rational perſons to j dge, w hat he will be able to do, after he has finiſhed the Conqueſt of the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, for that he will be then not only diſcharg'd of the moſt conſiderable part of his care and Expence, but that he will be alſo maſter of a Countrey, that by means of its ordinary Subſidies will be able to furniſh with money

money to pay an Army of fifty thouſand men, with all the charges thereto belonging. And that in the ſame Countreys he ſhall be ſupplyed with men, Souldiers and Officers as good as any in *Europe*. That the *Empire*, *Spain*, *Holland*, *Switzerland*, *Italy*, and *England* more eſpecially have reaſon to tremble at the thoughts that ſuch a thing ſhould come to paſs, if they do not rather arm their whole puiſſance, and undauntedly both in general and particular make it their buſineſs to prevent the ſame. For certainly it is their common Intereſt, ſince that if ſuch a Conqueſt ſhould be effected by the French, the infallible loſs of all their Liberties would follow next.

And for the more home urging of this matter, that we may give you to underſtand the fatal Poſture of the affairs of *Europe* at this time, & how advantagious they are to facilitate the deſigned Conqueſts of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty if once he obtain the entire poſſeſſion of the Spaniſh

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Netherlands, we are ſeriouſly to conſider, that as for *Germany*, after ſuch a ſucceſs of the French Force, his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty will be in a condition, not only to ſupport his Alliances, as he does in *Swedeland* and *Poland*, ſo in other parts of the Empire, but alſo to enable thoſe Alliances to advance their heads without any danger. For by that correſpondence which this Monarch keeps with the *Ottoman* Court, being able to prevent for ſome years the *Turk* or the Precopite *Tartar* from making any irruption into *Poland*, I leave the world to judge how impoſſible a thing it will be for his Highneſs the Elector of *Brandenburgh* to defend *Pomerania* and *Pruſſia*, while his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty occaſions the attacque of his Provinces, ſhould his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, as we have already ſaid, attacque his Territories of *Cleves* and *Mark*, with an Army of forty or fifty thouſand men, without any hindrance at all to the ſame Monarch to

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maintain and carry on his Conquests in *Lorain*, *Burgundy*, and *Luxemburgh*, either with as numerous or a bigger Army in those parts.

Which happening to be true, it will be an infallible Consequence, upon the Conquest of the Spanish-*Netherlands*, that the Emperor and the Empire will in all probability be constrain'd to bid adieu for ever to whatever depends upon the Patrimony of the Emperor from the *Rhine* to the Frontiers of *France*, in the same manner as the same Empire has been already forc'd to do to the three Bishopricks of *Toul*, *Metz* and *Verdun*. For the Dutchies of *Cleves* and *Juliers* being subdu'd all of a sudden, we may easily foresee that two things will infallibly come to pass. First, that the Imperial Army, or at least so much as relates to the Elector of *Bavaria* and his friends in the Empire, will be forc'd to keep on the other side of the *Rhine*, perhaps in a posture of single defence, while the Princes of *Westphalia*, either compelled

led by the neceſſity of the time, or in purſuance of their own obligations, ſhall joyn with *France*, as being thereto already well inclin'd and diſpos'd.

The ſecond is, that *Holland* being humbled and brought down by the calamities and loſſes ſuſtain'd in the preſent war, or the Conqueſt already made, ſhall be forc'd to agree to ſome diſhonourable peace; and that with ſo much the more reaſon, in regard that by the loſs of the Spaniſh *Netherlands*, and the Dutchy of *Cleves*, it will be out of all hope of being ſuccour'd from any part, unleſs it be from *England*, from whence we know that that Republick can promiſe to themſelves but little favour, ſo long as the French ſhall have the chiefeſt Influence in that Court.

Now the Empire being reduc'd to this Extremity, it is moſt certain that nothing can follow but the total Ruine of the ſame Empire, if by any peace at the diſcretion of the Miniſtry of *France*, the Hollanders

ders are forc'd to ſatisfie the deſigns of the Ambitious Monarch of that Nation.

The Empire and *Holland* being thus humbl'd and brought down, we muſt conclude that *France* will be at liberty to chooſe for the ſubject of its Triumphs *Spain*, *Italy* or *England*, at its own pleaſure.

As for *Spain*, two things being viewed and conſider'd; the firſt, its natural depopulations; the ſecond the want of fortifi'd places in the heart and Bowels of the Kingdom, it is moſt certain that there is nothing but its ſcarcity of Proviſions and victuals in the very centre of it, that can ſave it from an Univerſal Invaſion from *France*. But let the ſcarcity of Victuals be what it will, that can be no obſtruction, but that his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, notwithſtanding thoſe natural defects, entring by the paſſages of *Fontaraby*, with an Army only of thirty or forty thouſand men, and by the paſſages of *Catalogne* with the ſame number,

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by the means of theſe two Armies, would in two Campagnes be able to make himſelf maſter of *Navarr*, *Arragon*, *Catalogne*, and the Kingdom of *Valencia*, and after that having well fortifi'd his Frontiers, may be in a condition to conſtrain the King of *Spain* to become his Tributary for the Kingdom of *Caſtile*, and after that to grant him what part he ſhall deſire of his Territories in *Italy*, and the *Weſt Indies*, which is an affair not altogether unworthy the ſerious reflection of *England*.

As to *Italy* there are four things to be conſider'd. Firſt the importance of thoſe Poſts which his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty has already got poſſeſſion of, in three different parts of the Country, by means whereof he has a free entry into *Italy*, which way ſoever he pleaſes.

The ſecond is the natural diviſion of *Italy* into ſeveral littleſtates, which are for the moſt part very inconſiderable, & will be ready to joyn with the

the French Monarch, if they are not already his creatures.

Thirdly that *Italy*, formerly the moſt generous Nation in the world, by the fatal viciſſititude of things is now become the moſt ſoft and effeminate. The fourth is, that his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty is maſter of the *Italian* Sea. Whoſoever then conſiders all theſe things, will be eaſily convinc'd, that if *Lewis* the 14th. aſſail *Italy* with all his forces, that nation will not be in a condition to make any more reſiſtance againſt him, than it did againſt *Charles* the Eighth, and that if *Lewis* gets a footing once within it, it will not be ſo eaſie to drive him out, as it was *Charles* the Eighth. For both the Genius's, Politicks and forces you have to deal withall are far different, as alſo the Conjunctures of former opportunities from thoſe at preſent. Moreover we are to conſider that upon an irruption of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſties forces into

to the moſt delightful part of Chriſtendom, *Italy* can have nothing to rely upon but the ſtrength of her own native forces; for any ſuccour ſhe can expect, I ſee none in a caſe to afford it her but the *Turk*, *Germany* and *Spain* being ſuppoſed to be brought ſo low as not to be in a condition for any ſuch effort. Nor do I think that the *Swiſſes* dare undertake any ſuch enterprize, or if they ſhould, that their ſtrength would prove any thing conſiderable. From all which reaſons I determinately conclude, that if *France* attaque *Italy*, which 'tis very probable he will do after he has attaqu'd and ſubdu'd the Empire and *Spain*, *Italy* will be entirely loſt, and the Court of *Rome* it ſelf will be glad to draw her ſelf out of the broiles, by conferring the ſame honours, & granting the ſame priviledges to *Lewis* the 14th. as ſhe did formerly to *Charlemaigne*, and ſeveral of his ſucceſſours, that being one of the principal Articles which ſhe

muſt make uſe of to ſatisfie the vaſt ambition and ſoaring deſigns of this Monarch.

Theſe great things being thus brought to paſs, there will nothing remain to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, but to ſubdue all his neighbours, and to bring the *Switzers* and the Engliſh under his Yoak.

For the firſt I have ſaid it and will ſay it again, I cannot tell how the Cantons and Confederate *Swiſſes* can be in a condition to defend themſelves, againſt all the efforts and aſſaults of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, they who have not one fortifi'd place in all their Territories, and who are alſo often divided in reſpect of their Religion; and when they ſhall be aſſail'd on all ſides, from *Italy*, *France*, *Burgundy* and *Germany*. Againſt which attempts ſhould they prove ſucceſsful, they would be more worthy of honour, than their Anceſtors ever were, for all their

their victories formerly obtain'd, againſt the ancient Dukes of *Auſtria* and *Burgundy*.

As for *Engl.* I know that Nation is warlike even to the height of valour, I know that Nation abounds with perſons of great gravity, judgment and capacity to penetrate into the deepeſt myſteries of State Politicks. I know moreover that the natural Situation of *Engl.* being a kind of fortification and bulwark, that it ſeems invincible againſt all the attempts and deſigns of her enemies, and that joyning all theſe circumſtances to what ſhe is able further to do, conſidering the natural antipathy which every true Engliſh man naturally preſerves in his breaſt againſt the French Nation, we may from thence conclude, that his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty will find it a very difficult task to bring that famous Iſland under his ſubjection; and that though he ſhould make a conqueſt of it, yet it will be a labour as difficult to keep

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it. But on the other ſide it would be to make a wrong judgment of the Politicks of the French Miniſtry, to imagine, that if they undertake either the deſtruction or the Conqueſt of *England*, they would make uſe of their own forces, without ſome plauſible pretence, to deprive ſo great a King, their Allie, of his Dominions. *France* is too cunning and diligent in her Politick Managements, not to make uſe of more refin'd methods of craft and Intrigue. And it is a certain and real argument, that the French Politicks are already at work for the ruin and deſtruction of *England*, if by a Heroick and univerſal arming of the whole Nation, the Engliſh do not put themſelves into a poſture both by Sea and Land to ſtop the progreſs of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, and the unwary proceedings of thoſe among them, who joyn and cloſe with the French Monarch to the utter ruin of their Native Country.

I ſay there is a neceſſity, to take notice of this piece of Truth, and to dive into the Bottom of two things, the natural deſigns of the Court of *England*; and ſecondly, the condition wherein his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty will be, after a compleated Conqueſt of the Spaniſh *Netherlands*, by means of ſuch formal Succours as he ſhall ſend into *England*, to bring about the deſigns of the prevailing party to triumph at length over the unwary cunning of the one, and the weakneſs of the reſt.

As for the real deſigns of the intereſted Courtriers at this conjuncture, we may conclude them to be ſuch undoubtedly, and the ſame with thoſe that engag'd the *Engliſh*, at the beginning of the preſent Wars, to confederate with his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, againſt the Republick of the United Provinces, and by conſequence againſt all the Allies of that Republick.

And

And a moſt notorious proof of this aſſertion is this, that without doubt *England* it ſelf did not ſo well ponder and weigh thoſe truths which I am now going to advance, on purpoſe to let Chriſtendom apparently underſtand the inevitable danger into which all Chriſtendom muſt of neceſſity fall, by being forc'd to ſubmit to the yoke of *France*, through the Conqueſt of the Spaniſh *Netherlands*. Now *England* being ſenſible of this Truth, and ſeeing withal that by the continuance of theſe Succeſſes, his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty will be in a condition to keep up an Army of above 150000 fighting men, for which he will have no employment, if he do not ſend them againſt *England*; and yet lying ſtill, and not uſing any endeavours to hinder the Progreſs of theſe Succeſſes; we muſt of neceſſity conclude, that *England* acts according to the ſame principles which engag'd her to confederate at the beginning of the war with *France*, and that her mediation abroad does only tend to do the French ſome more important kindneſs, to bring to paſs the deſigns of that Court, than ſhe could do by the aſſiſtance of her Arms and a publick Declaration of War, which might be a means to diſcover, and put a ſtop to the conduct of ſelf-intereſt.

And

And it is an irrefragable proof, that the Self-intereſted, and the *French* Party in *England* are firm in the ſaid Deſign, for that when the *Muſcovite* threatned the *Swede* with an Invaſion of *Livonia*, at the ſame time that, by the Management of *France*, the Great *Turk* alſo threatned the *Muſcovite* with an Irruption into his Dominions, in caſe he invaded the *Swede*; the *French* Party in *England*, at the ſame time threatned the Grand *Czar* that if he medled with the *Swede*, they would ſend a conſiderable Fleet of men of War into the *Baltick* Sea: which proves not only what I have already declar'd, as to *England*, but alſo that *France*, the *Turk*, and the *French* Party in *England*, obſerving the ſame meaſures, without being any longer able to conceal them, have form'd ſuch a League, which, together with the Branches of it, that extend themſelves into many Parts of *Europe*,

make it evident, what apprehenſi-ons *Chriſtendom* ought to have of the Enterprizes of his moſt Chriſti-an Majeſty, to which his Confede-rates are made inſtrumental, either through Unwarineſs or Self-intereſt.

Now it being thus evident that *England* acts as a Co-partner with *France*, ſome may be nice to exa-mine the general and particular aim of ſuch Proceedings.

I ſhall ſay nothing of the publick treaty between *England* and *France*, at the beginning of this War, only that therein we may find two things.

Firſt, That if the *French* and *Popiſh* Party in *England* do reſolve to perſiſt in the obſervation of the ſaid Treaty, that then, upon the loſs of the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, to the ancient Owners, *England* will be put to a hard choice, either to forgoe her ancient Rights and Pri-viledges to the Will of that ſame Self-

Self-intereſted *Popiſh* Party, or elſe, with all their Might, to withſtand the united Force of the *French* King, and the *French* and *Popiſh* Party, in *England*, that ſhall attempt to conſtrain them to ſuch a Compliance.

The ſecond is this, That in regard it is impoſſible that the *Engliſh* ſhould willingly ſubmit to ſuch a Subjection, ſo it will be impoſſible for them to hinder the *French* from landing, ſo long as the aforeſaid Power prevails; who, before they quit their hold, nay, before they land, will be ſure to have ſome ſtrong Fort or Poſt aſſign'd them for their Security, as is uſual in ſuch caſes.

Which, if it fall out in this manner, who is ſo blind as not to ſee, that *England* being reduc'd to theſe Terms, it follows, that *France*, by the Triumphs of politick management, and by the unimitable Subtilty of it's Miniſters, will not on-

ly be in certain Condition, by fomenting the Troubles, to bring about the total Ruine of *England*, in regard that the Fortune of the prevailing Party, and conſequently of the Kingdom, will be at his diſpoſal; but alſo by the means of ſuch a favourable Conjuncture, after he has look'd on, while the *Engliſh* cut one another's Throats, to come in and maſter both Parties in the ſame manner as *Hengeſt* and *Horſus*, Generals of the *Anglo-Saxons*, being call'd in by *Vortiger* to aſſiſt him againſt the *Romans*, *Picts*, and *Scots*, overcame, not only all the Enemies of *Vortiger*, but he himſelf and all his Forces. Or, as more lately, the *Turk* o'recome the King of *Fez* in *Africa*, who had call'd him in to his Aſſiſtance againſt *Don Sebaſtin* King of *Portugal*.

It may be thought perhaps, that I have ſpok'n too freely; but ſo it was, that the Son of *Cræſus*, King of

of *Lydia*, being born dumb, ſeeing a Souldier with his Weapon advanced, ready to kill his Father, ſpoke then, that never ſpoke before: Who then cannot but ſpeak, that ſees his Native Country ready to be ſet together by the Ears, by a prevailing *French* and Popiſh Party? For to declare who I am, I am an *Engliſh* man, born and bred up in the *Roman Catholick* Faith; but by the Grace and Favour of God, reclaim'd from thoſe Erroneous Opinions and Doctrines, both as to Faith and Politicks, with which my Studies at *Leige* had infatuated me.

Now, as to the opportunity of being an *Engliſh* Man, and a *Roman Catholick*, gave me that Advantage to be admitted into ſeveral private Conferences held at *Paris* and *London* among thoſe of my own Nation and Religion; and for that I had thereby the means to penetrate to the Bottom, and to diſcover the Malignity of the preſent Deſigns:

It is the particular Knowledge of the preſent Misfortunes, which, together with my Conſcience and my Honour, have cauſed me to put Pen to Paper, as one that would be accounted faithful to my Country, and a true Chriſtian, to advertiſe my dear Country, that theſe Misfortunes which I have preſuppoſed, are ſo much the more likely to come to paſs, conſidering that the *French* Miniſtry, having prudently foreſeen, that it is impoſſible for his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty to pretend to the Conqueſt of the *Spaniſh* Low Countreys, unleſs he be ſecure of *England*, have made it the chiefeſt Maſter-piece of their Craft and Cunning to ſeparate the Intereſt of the *Engliſh* Miniſtry from that of the Kingdom, and make them two diſtinct things: For the one having made the other believe, that if they would but ſacrifice the *Spaniſh* Netherlands to his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, that then he would gratifie

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the other with the Conqueſt of the *Spaniſh Indies*, the Wealth of which places, would put the *French-Engliſh* Party into ſuch a Condition, as never to want, or fear a Parliament. This is the Knot which ties *France* and *England* together; but becauſe the *French* Party in the Court of *England* as wiſely foreſaw, that it was impoſſible to form a party in *England* againſt the Priviledges and Intereſt of the Kingdom: For that very reaſon it was, that they pretended to ſet on Foot the pretence of Religion; and becauſe it was well known, that there was a great Number of *Roman Catholicks* in *England*, and thoſe too, generally very zealous for their Religion, though as generally very ignorant; therefore it was, that his Highneſs the D. of *York*-embrac'd the *Roman Catholick* Religion, and afterwards, to declare himſelf openly for the ſame Party; which he never did do, till he had a full proſpect, after

the Succeſſes of the laſt Compaign, of the weakneſs of the Confederacy in oppoſition to *France*, and that the Forces of the latter were ſufficient to beat all the reſt put together, unleſs *England* ſtruck in to their Aſſiſtance.

Upon this ground it was, that after the Arrival of the Dutcheſs of *Orleans* at *Dover*, ſo many Courriers were ſeen to poſt between *Paris* and *London*; neither the Peace between *England* and *Holland*, nor any thing elſe that happen'd ſince or before this War, being able to ſtop the Career of theſe Proceedings.

Upon this Confidence it was, that many *French* Prieſts came into *England* in ſuch Numbers, that beſides that every Corner of *London* was full of them; it is moſt certain, that there is not a City or conſiderable Town in *England*, *Scotland*, or *Ireland*, where theſe *Indiſcreet Zealots* have not got Footing.

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From hence it was, that the Court of *Rome*, which was not ignorant of theſe Proceedings, ſo much rejoyc'd at the beginning of this War which *France* and *England*, made at the ſame time againſt the Commonwealth of the united Provinces; though that Court has had cauſe ſufficient to underſtand the Nature of the *French* Zeal, by what has happen'd through the Power of the *French* Armies, to one of the Eccleſiaſtical Electors of the Empire, as in the moſt part of the Churches of his Capital City.

Upon this ground it was, that the laſt Parliament was prorogu'd for eighteen Months, which ended not till the overture of this preſent Seſſions, and all to gain time to gain the Members to their Party, wherein we had like to have felt the fatal Conſequences of their Succeſs.

Now I ſay, That this Misfortune is ſo much the more likely, by how much it appears to be certain, that the

King of *France* is in a Condition, before a year come about, to make a Conqueſt of the greateſt part of the Places and Provinces of the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, and thereby be enabl'd to ſubdue all the reſt of his Enemies; and then by means of Sorceries in *England*, to maintain continual Diviſions in that Kingdom, and by vertue of thoſe Diviſions, to waft over a conſiderable part of his Forces for the ſupport of his Party, and ſo at length, to make himſelf Maſter of them, and the whole Nation. In which Attempt, it will be the more eaſie for *France* to ſucceed, in regard, that *England* may be certainly aſſur'd, that there are, within the very Center of her Dominions, no leſs than fifty thouſand Papiſts, whoſe Conſciences are govern'd by *French* Monks and Prieſts, and conſequently, ready to take Arms upon firſt Opportunity, in purſuance of their Deſigns, and to joyn with twelve thouſand Papiſts

piſts more, that now ſerve in the Armies of *France*, which would certainly ſtick cloſe to the *French* upon their landing in *England*. Now I ſay this, That this 'tis which *England* may conclude to be certain, with ſo much the more Credit and Reaſon to be believ'd, becauſe the Memoirs, Rolls, and Inſtructions, have not been conceal'd from me; and all theſe things maintain'd and carry'd on by the Management of the Miniſtry and Counſels of *France*: whereby my dear Country may ſee what is preparing againſt her, both within and without, for her total Deſtruction, for which, there is no other Remedy, but by a general Reſolution, to lay aſide all diſputes of Religion, which the indiſcreet Zealots of all Sects unwarily ſet afoot, and to beſtir themſelves for the effecting of five things. The firſt, to joyn in a league of Confederacy with the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and

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the *Hollanders*, and not to ſeparate until there ſhall be a Peace made to the full Satisfaction of all in general, and every one in particular. Secondly, in caſe the Parliament that is now in Being, do not act more cordially than they have done, for the Honour and Intereſt of the Nation by their humble Repreſentations and Addreſſes, to beſeech his Majeſty to call another.

Thirdly, to implore the Expulſion of all the *French* Emiſſaries, of what quality ſoever, out of all the three Kingdoms, without Exception.

Fourthly, to recall, by an authentick Decree, under pain of Felony, all the *Engliſh* and *Scotch* who are now in the *French* Service; for as for the natural *Iriſh*, it will not be amiſs, to let them ſtay behind, and waſt themſelves in the Wars: for though they be *Roman Catholicks*, yet are they as fanatical

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in the Faith of that Church, as the weak Sectaries of the Proteſtant Religion, are in reference to their Tenents, and conſequently, dangerous Thorns in a Kingdom.

Fifthly, To ſet forth a Navy as powerful as the Nation is able to provide, of which, the principal Officers muſt be ſuch as are no way leven'd with the ſelf-intereſt of the *French* Popiſh Faction; and to furniſh this Navy with ſuch a number of men, as may be able to make an Invaſion into ſuch a part of *France*, as ſhall be thought moſt convenient, worthy the ancient Honour of the Nation; to which purpoſe, the Heads of the Parties in *France* may be conſulted, and never to part with ſuch places as ſhall be taken by the *Engliſh* Arms, till his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty ſhall be conſtrain'd to ſubmit to Equity and Juſtice, and to make ſuch a firm and ſolid Peace as may eſtabliſh the Repoſe of *Chriſtendom*, and reſtore

ſtore a Calm to *Europe*, and which may ſecure the *Engliſh* Nation from all her preſent Fears and Alarums. 'Tis by a Conduct of this Nature, that the Kingdom of *England* may be able, generally to prevent the Tempeſt with which the inſatiable Ambition of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty is preparing to overwhelm it, and which ſeems to be abſolutely inevitable, unleſs vigorouſly remedy'd by ſuch means as theſe.

By a Conduct of this nature, the whole Body of the *Roman Catholicks* in *England*, returning to their Allegiance, and coming to open their Eyes, might at length be brought to ſee, that it is impoſſible for a Prince, who has been the occaſion of the ſlaughter of ſo many millions of Chriſtians within theſe few years, for the only Satisfaction of his Ambition; who, led by the ſame ambitious principles, has made ſlight of all the Solemn Oaths which he took in the Iſland of *Faiſans*, before

before him whom he adores for God, before his Altars, that it is impoſſible, I ſay, for them to think that ſuch a Prince would trouble his Conſcience what Religion were profeſſed in *England:* only that it would ſerve him for a plauſible pretence, after he had overturn'd all the reſt of *Europe*, to make an Inundation upon the Cities and Habitations of my dear Countrymen, to burn and maſſacre, to raviſh our Wives and Daughters, and ſack and ruine the whole Nation, as he has already done, and ſtill does, in *Lorrain*, *Burgundy*, *Alſatia*, and the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, though Peopled by *Roman Catholicks*. And indeed theſe Preventions ſeem therefore the more neceſſary, by how much the more true it is what I ſay. For, that my Brethren may underſtand me, the Diſpute is not here about Religion: that's but the mantle which covers the Deſign of the Popiſhly affected Party

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and their Leaders, to keep off the ſitting of Parliaments. For if his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty keep his word with that Party, the *Spaniſh Indies*, with all their Wealth and Riches, will belong to them, by means whereof, there will be no neceſſity for the calling a Parliament; but it ſhall be in the power of that Party, to keep up an Army of Foreigners in *England* ſo long as they pleaſe, and thereby to make themſelves the abſolute Maſters of the Laws and Liberties of the Subject. On the other ſide, if his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty break his Word with the *Popiſh-Engliſh* Faction, and conquer the *Spaniſh Indies* for himſelf, which is moſt probable, (it being no part of *Richileu*'s Politicks) which *Lewis* the 14th treds in ſtep by ſtep, to take much heed to the obſervation of Treaties, (as *Spain* too cruelly experiments at this time) I leave the World to judge what will become of *Eng-*

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By this Reflexion it may be ſeen, that if *Spain* falls, all *Europe* falls, not excepting *England*; and it is yet in the only power of *England* to prevent this; there is a neceſſity to have recourſe to this Remedy, as we ſhould run to quench a Fire that had ſeiz'd upon *White-hall*; that is to ſay, there is not a moment to be loſt, if *England* intends not to periſh in the General Deſolation. Religion, Charity, and the General Intereſt of the Kingdom, demand this Diligence, that my

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dear Countrey would unanimouſly agree to give that powerful Aſſiſtance to that ancient Allie, and by ſaving her ſelf heroical, to acquire the Honour of having preſerv'd the whole Body of Chriſtendom from that univerſal Shipwrack, with which the *French* Fury threatens it.

I know that by means of that cold Poiſon which the Emiſſaries of *France* inſinuate, and ſow about in all parts, and which is more eſpecially naturaliz'd and intruded into *England*, as being moſt proper to calm the tempeſtuous Jealouſies of that Nation; there are ſome that aver with ſome Probability, that ſhould *England* be quiet and not aſſiſt the Confederates with her Arms, yet that there may be plauſible Expedients found out to make an honourable Peace between all the Puiſſances now at Wars. But my dear Country muſt know, that this was only a Propoſal

poſal hatch'd in the Cabinet of the *French* Miniſtry, to amuſe and blind *England*, and with her all *Europe*: and that I may in three words make out this Truth, beſides what I have ſaid already, I beſeech the Reader to obſerve, that ſuppoſe this very day, by the Mediation of *England*, there ſhould be a Peace ſign'd, which I believe very uulikely to be done, for ſeveral Reaſons too long to be here inſerted: We muſt needs ſay, that in the natural Condition of Affairs at preſent, this Peace cannot be concluded, but to the great Advantage of *France*, as alſo, for the Intereſt of her Allies; which being true, two things will infallibly happen upon a Concluſion made in that manner: the firſt, that the Empire, *Spain*, and *Holland*, will retire to their ſeveral Homes, weary and haraſs'd by the Inconveniences of the War; the ſecond, that his moſt Chriſtian

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Majeſty, beſide the real Honour and Advantages which he ſhall get by this War, ſhall be furniſh'd with an Army of a hundred thouſand men, as brisk Souldiers as any in *Europe*; which for ſeveral Reaſons of State and War that ſpeak of themſelves, he will never diſband. Now if the prevailing diſaffected Party in *England* perſiſt in their Deſigns of bringing all things under an Arbitrary Power, I ask any true *Engliſhman*, whether it be the Intereſt of *England* by a Peace of the Nature above recited, that *France* ſhould be in a Condition, by the loan of an Army of fifty thouſand men, which he can eaſily ſpare to his Party in *England*, by an Invaſion of that Force, to procure the Ruine of our Country in one year.

Moreover, it behoves us to obſerve, that in caſe ſuch a Peace ſhould be made, it would be of no other

other Service to *France*, than to enable him, in leſs than three years, by the Recruits of his Treaſuries and Finances, ſecuring his Intreagues in *England*, in the *North*, and among the Princes of the Empire, while the *Rhine* being without any guard, and it may be the great Turk entred *Hungary*, to powre himſelf with a hundred thouſand Men into the *Spaniſh* Netherlands, and the Empire, which is no more than to recoyl, that he may return with a greater Force, and to take time to conſult his Meaſures, how to war with leſs Danger, and more Succeſs; which is no more for the Diſtreſſed, than to run out of the Frying-pan into the Fire. The Lion is out of his Den, the Hunters are at his Heels; and there is no more to be done, than to ſpread the *Engliſh* Toils to the Sea Coaſt-ward, and there to poſt the Huntſ-men. We owe this charitable Aſſiſtance to our moſt Ancient Fellow-Citizens, and the

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I beg the Reader's Pardon, if tranſported with that Zeal with which my Heart is enflam'd for the Intereſt of my dear Country, I have enlarg'd my ſelf upon this point of the Condition and Intereſt of *England*: I could not either in Honour or Conſcience, refrain from making a Diſcovery of a myſterious Combination that goes about to tarniſh the Honour of *England*, ſhould this Misfortune proceed any farther. I declare that my Animoſity extends it ſelf no farther, than againſt thoſe Evil Counſellors, who being corrupted with the Gold of *France*, have betray'd that Fidelity which they ow'd both to their Country and their Prince. Moreover I am an *Engliſh* Man, that is to ſay, born with my Native Liberty, to declare my opinion upon ſo nice a point as the Preſervàtion of Law and Liberty, ought to be to every true born *Engliſh* man: For that in Truth, we have as much right to

natural Subjects of *England*. A fair Opportunity offers it ſelf glorioufly to reunite to the Crown of our Monarch, thoſe Flowers that ought to be inſeparable from it. Thoſe unfortunate people, oppreſſed by the power of the *French* Tyranny, ſtretch forth their Arms to us; let us not abandon them any longer to the Fury of that deſpotick Power, as being the only means to reſtore both our own, and the peace of the Empire, ſo neceſſary to put it into a Condition to be able to reſiſt the Violence of the Common Enemy of the Chriſtian Faith. I ſay, this is the only means, to the end, that my dear Country, abus'd and intoxicated with *French* Poyſon, may not be ſo blinded as to run blindly into the Snares of thoſe Propoſitions for Peace, which without the Remedy already propos'd, can prove no other than an infallible Expedient to enſlave all *Europe*.

maintain that Birth-right of ours, as our Kings have to maintain the Rights and Priviledges of their Thrones and Scepters.

But, while I am enlarging upon this Point, ſome Perſon, either out of Ignorance or Corruption, may perhaps take upon him to gloſs upon this formidable Power, which I have attributed to *France*, to the end that my dear Country, and all other Princes and People, whoſe Intereſt it is to abate the Power of *France*, may be the better inſtructed to make a ſolid and right Judgment of it both in general and particular, of the formidable Force of *France*, I deſire the Reader to make a true and ſincere Parallel between the Reigns of *Charles* the Fifth, and *Francis* the Firſt, and the Reigns of *Lewis* the Fourteenth, and *Charles* the Second of *Spain*; for by that only *Examen* you will find that I have ſpoken but very ſparingly and modeſtly of the vaſt Power

Power of *France*, which I ſhall endeavour to make appear by a ſuccinct Examination of this Parallel.

Charles the Fifth, under the Titles of Emperour, King of *Spain*, King of *Naples*, *Sicily*, and *Sardigna*, Duke of *Milan*, and chief of the Houſes of *Burgundy* and *Auſtria*, united in his own Perſon, the immenſity of a vaſt Puiſſance, which, after ſome Victory obtain'd againſt his Enemies, gave him the advantage, to diſpoſe of an abſolute Power, all the Forces of *Germany*, the Seventeen Provinces of the *Low-Countreyes*, *Italy* and *Spain*, who by his Orders alone, march'd undauntedly under his Banners, to execute the Commands of this Monarch, as, at preſent, thoſe of *France* obey the Orders of *Lewis* the Fourteenth.

Charles the Fifth was undoubtly the greateſt Captain, and the greateſt Souldier that Chriſtendom had produced for ſeveral Ages.

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Charles the Fifth had under him the moſt Famous Perſons, both for Military and Civil Affairs, which either the Empire, or the Monarchy of *Spain* ever had.

Germany, *Italy*, the *Provinces* of the *Low Countreys*, and Spain, were full of great Armies, vigorous and well-diſciplin'd, and the *Ocean* and *Mediterranean* Seas ſaw nothing more noble nor magnificent than the Fleets of that Monarch.

Moreover, this Prince was one that weigh'd, digeſted, and reſolv'd the moſt difficult and important Affairs, that were handled either in his Military or Civil Councils, and like a ſecond *Cæſar*, confronting in Perſon all ſorts of Perils and Dangers, encourag'd by his preſence in all ſorts of places, the Valour of his Captains and Souldiers, in all his moſt important Expeditions.

Notwithſtanding, this Great Emperour, with all the Territories, Forces, and Advantages that he had, find-

finding himſelf neceſſitated to declare a War againſt *Francis* the Firſt of *France*, who, in all had not above thirty millions of Annual Income; and although he had withdrawn from the Service of *France* the Duke of *Bourbon*, who carried the ſame ſway in that Countrey, which the Prince of *Conde* may be ſaid to do now, had nevertheleſs ſuch an opinion of the Force of *France*, that he would not engage himſelf in that War, till he had firſt made a League with *Henry* the Eighth, the Pope, and other the moſt conſiderable Princes of *Europe*.

And yet, notwithſtanding all his precaution and warineſs, Experience tells us, that *Francis* the Firſt was in a condition, not onely to defend himſelf againſt all the Violence of that League, but that alſo, had it not been for that ſame accident, and which was but an accident, of his being taken Pris'ner at the Battel of *Pavia*, *Francis* the Firſt

had found the Emperour work enough, and given him his hands full, seeing, that after he was set at liberty, he was so powerful as to constrain the Emperour to grant him several mitigations in reference to the Treaty of Peace which he had sign'd during his Imprisonment, and that he left his Kingdom in that condition which it has invincibly maintain'd and preserv'd, notwithstanding all its Civil Wars, against the Puissance both of the *Spanish* Monarchy and the Empire.

Now to make a just and exact parallel between those, and the Conjunctures of these Times, we must observe, that *Francis* the First, as we have already declar'd, had not above thirty Millions of Annual Income, and that *Lewis* the 14th, who now Reigns, at this hour that I write, has infallibly above an hundred and fifty Millions within the onely circuit of his Kingdom.

That

That *Francis* the Firſt durſt not undertake any thing of high Concern, but by the Conſent of his Eſtates General and his Parlaments, and that *Lewis* the Fourteenth reigns deſpotically, with an abſolute Power over all his Subjects.

That *Francis* the Firſt had a *Charles* the Fifth to grapple with, comprehends all the reſt, and that *Lewis* the Fourteenth has onely a *Charles* the Second, and a *Ferdinand* to deal with: the one but ſixteen years of Age, the other, a Prince, without doubt, endued with all the Heroick Virtues hereditary to thoſe of his moſt Illuſtrious Houſe, but of a Diſpoſition placid and pacifick, and who has no other end in oppoſing the Enterprizes of *Lewis* the Fourteenth, by Force of Arms, but out of an abſolute neceſſity to prevent the total Ruine of the Empire and his whole Family.

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Charles the Fifth, as he was onely King of *Spain*, and the Territories annex'd thereto, kept alwayes on foot, upon the Frontiers of *Spain*, in *Italy*, and the *Low Countries*, great Armies of ſix and twenty thouſand men a piece: Whereas *Charles* the Second, having ſuffer'd great Loſſes of his Dominions in every Quarter, has not now at this time above thirty thouſand effective in all, although *Lewis* the Fourteenth attacques him in all his Dominions with Forces more conſiderable than ever *Charles* the Fifth made uſe of againſt *France*.

Charles the Fifth had alwayes ready in his Ports, and upon the Coaſts of the *Low-Countreys*, a Navy of fifty Men of War, which, having a Correſpondence with his *Spaniſh* Fleet on the main Ocean, gave Laws to *France* ſo abſolutely on that ſide, that we do not find in any Hiſtory that ever *France* durſt make Head by Sea againſt that

that Great and famous Emperour. And at this time I do not know that *Spain* is able to ſet to Sea ſix men of War on that ſide; where *France* is now ſo ſtrong, that ſome Months ſince, out of the abundance of their number, they had both the Courage and the Force to ſend a Fleet to the *Weſt Indies*, which made there conſiderable Conqueſts.

Charles the Fifth, by reaſon of his Naval Strength in the *Mediterranean* Sea, and through the convenience of his Ports upon the Coaſt of *Spain*, *Italy*, and *Africa*, kept, as it were block'd up, in the Ports of *Thoulon* and *Marſeilles*, all the Naval Force of *France*: Whereas the Naval Force of *France* being ſo vaſtly augmented in thoſe Parts, has ſo ſtrangely ſpread it ſelf, that, being abſolutely Maſters of thoſe Seas, within theſe two years, the *Spaniards* dare no longer appear, but with the Convoyes of ſome one of their Allies. *Charles* the Second

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has been no way able to prevent his total Ruine, but by Leagues and Confederacies: *Lewis* the fourteenth ſuſtains himſelf merely by the force of his Arms. *Charles* the Second wants both Men and Money, and *Lewis* the Fourteenth abounds in both.

Charles the Fifth was ſole Maſter of the ſeventeen Provinces, and *Lewis* the fourteenth has invaded the chief places of the ten that belong'd to the *Spaniards* after the Separation of the ten that form'd the Common-wealth of *Holland*, all which he has taken from *Charles* the ſecond, together with the County of *Burgundy* entirely.

In a word, I cannot ſpeak it too often, the *Spaniſh* Monarchy is tumbling, & with that, all the reſt of *Europe*, if *Europe*, but more chiefly *England*, do not counterpoiſe the formidable Force of *France*, to prevent her being invaded, and forc'd to ſubmit to the ſame Yoak, which he has

has impos'd upon his own Subjects.

This is that which I have to ſay upon this Parallel, from which, by the natural Deductions and Conſequences that may be drawn, it plainly appears, that I may come to my Concluſion, that by the Loſs of *Valencienns*, *Cambray*, and St. *Omers*, in three weeks time, his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty is in a fair way, if there be no ſtop put to his Succeſſes, to triumph over the reſt of *Europe*.

From this Argument it is that I conclude, that all the Princes and People of *Europe* who love their own Preſervation, their Honour and their Liberty, ought to take the Loſs of thoſe three places for a ſignal and univerſal Alarum given to all *Europe*, to run to their Arms, and marſhal themſelves with all diligence under the Banners of Juſtice and Equity; to the end, that the Princes who command this gene-

rous party, may be enabl'd, for the univerſal good of *Chriſtendom*, to vanquiſh thoſe cruel Legions that ſo victoriouſly march under the Enſigns of Injuſtice and Cruelty, and puft up with their Conqueſts, ſo inſolently advance to the general Deſtruction of all *Europe*.

It is this Alarum that gives warning to *Italy* to put her ſelf into a poſture by vertue of a unanimous League between all her Potentates and Republicks, as alſo by the Efforts of her Arms, as well by Sea as Land, to drive back all the Forces of *France*, not only from the Coaſts and Iſland of *Sicily*, but to expel them, if poſſible, out of all *Italy*; and this at a time while the *Roman* Eagles hold the chief Director of the *French* Armes in play. Whereas, if *Italy* neglect ſo fair an opportnnity to prevent the Yoak that threatens them, if the Empire once fall, ſhe can never be able to repair ſo great a Loſs, and then ſhe can

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expect nothing but the Misfortunes which are inſeparable from Conqueſts, and of which the Deſolations of *Alſatia* are a dreadful Proſpect to lay in tablature before their Eyes.

'Tis this Alarum that ought to excite the *Swiſſes* with all their Allies and Confederates, to lay hold upon this preſent and only Conjuncture, and by an authentick and general Decree of all the whole Nation, to recall all their Forces, out of the Service of the *French*, and with the ſame Forces, and others of their Confederates and Allies joyn'd with them, tho it were at their own Expence, which *Spain* would doubtleſs never allow, to go and wreſt from the *French* the Garriſons of *Burgundy*, and clear that County of ſuch bad Neighbours, as being the only *Bulwark* of their Liberty, in the hands of their Majors, if they do not intend to looſe the only

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Opportunity of delivering themſelves from that Slavery to which the Pride and Proſperity of *France* deſigns them.

'Tis this Alarum that puts *England* in mind of the near Fall of her Honour, and the approaching Loſs of her Liberty, if by a noble Attempt worthy of the Valour of the Nation ſhe do not include her ſelf in the preſent League of Confederacy; and by Acts worthy the *Engliſh* Generoſity, ſhe do not endeavour to aſſume to her ſelf the Glory of having ſav'd all *Europe* in ſaving her ſelf.

This Alarum tells the Conquering Princes of one part of the Territories of *Swedeland*, in the Verge of the Empire, that thoſe Territories are ſufficiently conſiderable to reward their Heroick Endeavours, for the Preſervation of themſelves, though *Spain* ſhould be utterly unable to gratifie them one Farthing, though he can never without doubt

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be brought ſo low, if the *Spaniſh* Netherlands be but preſerved.

This Alarum it is that reſounds to all the Princes of the Empire, both in general and in particular, as well thoſe who have hitherto won ſo much Honour out of Zeal to their Duty, as thoſe who have ſuffer'd themſelves hitherto to be abus'd, either by the Artifices of *France*, or the Corruption of their own Servants, that he who directly attacques the Head, directly attacques the Members, and that he who preſerves no Reſpect for the Head, has none for thoſe Princes, that as Members depend upon the Head. The Fortune of the Dutcheſs of *Lorrain* and *Bar*, with the Fortreſs of *Pignerol*, may give them ſenſibly to underſtand, that neither the reſpect of Blood, Alliances or Treaties, are of that Reſtraint; but that the Maxims of the *French* Politicks, will ſacrifice them all to their Ambition.

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The demoliſhing of the Fortreſs of *Orange*, being a ſufficient Argument, that there is nothing but the bare honourary Title of Duke and Peer, that is to be tolerated in *France*.

This ſame Alarum may alſo reach the Ears of his Holineſs, and let him know, that if the Emiſſaries of *France* do flatter him, that the Deſigns of that Monarch, are only to extend the Bounds of the *Roman* Catholick Faith; they are only Cheats and Deceivers: For it is apparent, that the Ambition of *France* aſpires at nothing more than to pull down Imperial Crowns and Princes, purely *Roman* Catholick. The laſt peace of *Poland*, with the Protections which *France* gives to the Proteſtants in *Hungary*, together with the Breaches of the ſame Miniſtry with *Spain*, ſufficiently teſtifie, do but make a Sport at Worſhip of the *Roman* Catholick Faith: It being certain to them that pene-

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trate into Affairs, that under the name of the *Janſeniſts* Partie in *France*, there is with much Circumſpection preſerv'd and cheriſh'd a ſort of Venom more dangerous to the Pontifical Chair, than whatever *Luther* or *Calvin* inſtituted in *Germany*: For they were declared, and open Enemies; theſe keep themſelves conceal'd, and cloſe under the Title of Zealous Catholicks, notwithſtanding that their Hearts, as they ſufficiently demonſtrate by their Actions, burn with the ſame Fury, and it may be with the ſame Religion of thoſe Ancient Northern People that ſo often took and ſack'd the Ancient *Rome*.

The ſame Alarum *Poland* ſeriouſly ought to take; for that if ſhe unwarily undertake to favour the Deſigns of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, the Enemy of his Imperial Majeſty and the Empire, it behoves her to take heed, that ſhe do not engage her ſelf to favour the Deſtruction

ction of the only Bulwark of her Safety, againſt all the formidable Attacks of the *Turk*; which it behoves *Poland* to take the more ſeriouſly into her Conſideration, in regard that it is the Intereſt of the Empire to take care of the Preſervation and Subſiſtance of *Poland*.

It is this Alarum that laſtly advertiſes all *France*, with a continued and mournful ſound, I ſpeak of the Kingdom in her three Eſtates, that if fourſcore and ten thouſand Gentlemen which are in *France* do not under the Favour of this preſent Conjuncture draw their Swords, and joyn with the honeſt Commonalty, to ſhake off the Yoak which now oppreſſes their Necks, the name of Nobility and free people, will be certainly extinguiſh'd over all that vaſt and populous Kingdom; in regard, that nothing but the frequent Meeting of the three Eſtates General of that Kingdom, which is

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able to re-eſtabliſh the Priviledges of thoſe Eſtates, totally loſt: which re-Eſtabliſhment being never to be brought to paſs, but by a univerſal taking up of Arms throughout the whole Kingdom, it may be certainly ſaid, that ſuch a Reſolution being taken at this Conjuncture, by joyning with thoſe Princes, who are now engag'd in the ſame War againſt the Court of *France*, and that alſo vigorouſly maintain'd till ſuch a Re-Eſtabliſhment were made according to their deſire, firm and laſting; there would be no Power upon the Earth which could ward off the Blow, but that his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty would be forc'd to vail Bonnet, and ſubmit to reaſon and Equity, as well in reſpect of his Subjects, as in reſpect of his Neighbours, which is ſo much the more neceſſary; by how much it ought to be laid down for a fundamental Maxim, that if by re-eſtabliſhment

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of the Liberties of *France*, which is not to be done but by the ſitting of the general Eſtates of the Kingdom. The Monarch of that Nation cannot be conſtrain'd to content himſelf with the ancient Revenues of that Crown; it is abſolutely impoſſible, that any one of his Neighbours can promiſe to themſelves either Peace or Security, which being ſo conſiderable and certain as I lay it down, I leave it to Judgment, how much it concerns all the oppreſs'd Nobility of *France* not to lay down Arms, till that deſpotick and arbitrary Power by ſome means or other, be abſolutely baniſh'd the Kingdom.

But if the people of this great and vaſt Kingdom will be ſo generous, as to attempt the ſhaking off a Yoak ſo heavy and oppreſſive; the ſame Alarum admoniſhes his Imperial Majeſty, and his Catholick Majeſty, together with their Allies,

lies, that theſe Worthy and Generous Undertakers ought to be ſuccour'd and protected after another manner than thoſe of *Bourdeaux*, the *Brittains* and *Lavedanois* were in their late Inſurrections; a fatal Experience, giving light to this moſt Renowned Houſe of *Auſtria*, and its Allies, that if thoſe Inſurrections had been foſter'd and ſuccour'd, according to the powerful Sollicitations of their Deputies abroad, his Catholick Majeſty had not been in a condition to have made thoſe notable Conqueſts which he has done theſe laſt Campaignes in the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, nor to furniſh the *Swede* and others with ſuch conſiderable Sums of Money, from whence thoſe Conſequences are to be drawn that ſpeak loud enough of themſelves to juſtifie the ſolidity of my Aſſertion in this particular.

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But if the Renowned Houſe of *Auſtria*, with all their Allies and Confederates, who are now in Arms againſt *France*, have any Intereſt ſo Supreme and importunate as I ſuppoſe they have, not to lay down Arms, till this Deſpotick Power be baniſhed out of *France*: How much does it concern *England* to ſuppreſs that formidable Power ſo threatning to them? I am ſatisfied, that only the Inſinuations and Profuſeneſs of the Court of *France* for theſe many years, have began a Self-intereſted and Popiſhly affected Party in that Nation, which laid the Foundations of all the Cataſtrophees that have appear'd upon the *Engliſh* Theatre, and which no doubt, the ſame Parties are endeavouring with the ſame Vigour to renew, if not prevented by a generous Confederacy of the *Engliſh* Nation againſt the Common Enemy, there being no other way to ſtop the Current of his moſt Chriſtian

ſtian Majeſties Profuſions abroad, by that means, according to the natural Deſcription which he expoſes to the World of his Abſolute Power over his Subjects, to inflame the Minds of other Princes with the ſame Ambition. And there are two Points ſo eſſential to the Intereſt of *England*, beſides thoſe that I have already related, that though the Renowued Houſe of *Auſtria*, with their Allies, were utterly unable either to foment or to protect an Enterprize of this Importance, *England* alone however ought to undertake ſuch an Heroick Work, the Succeſs whereof is ſo link'd to its Intereſt, that, if I had not reſolv'd here to conclude, I could make it out by many more undeniable Reaſons, that *England* cannot ſupport it ſelf but by the reeſtabliſhment of the *French* Liberty. Upon this Pole moves the whole Being of the Laws and Liberties of *England*, as well as the Uni-

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Univerſal Calm and Tranquility of *Europe*, and the Repoſe of *Chriſtendom*. And becauſe, perhaps, I may be thought by ſome to have ſpoken too much in the diſplay of ſo much Truth, I ſhall ſay no more, leaving to every one his full liberty to think and act according as his Parts, his Honour, and his Conſcience ſhall ſuggeſt; and ſo I conclude.

FINIS.